































European	 Union	 (EU)	 represents	 a	 turning	 point	 in	 the	 history	 of	 European	 integration.	
Leave	won	with	51.9	per	cent	voting	to	Leave	and	48.1	per	cent	voting	to	Remain.	England	
and	 Wales	 supported	 Leave	 with	 53.4	 per	 cent	 and	 52.5	 per	 cent	 respectively,	 while	
Scotland	and	Northern	 Ireland	had	a	Remain	majority	with	62	per	cent	and	55.8	per	cent	





In	 many	 ways	 this	 was	 a	 surprising	 result.	 While	 the	 UK	 is	 indeed	 amongst	 the	 most	
Eurosceptic	 countries	 in	 the	 EU,	 the	 consensus	 expectation	 was	 nonetheless	 for	 a	 tight	
outcome	in	favour	of	Remain:	Remain	was	the	choice	of	both	pollsters	and	bookmakers.	So	
how	may	we	explain	this	result?	This	chapter	focuses	on	the	political	economy	of	the	Brexit	
vote.	 It	 contributes	 to	 the	 debate	 on	 British	 Euroscepticism	 by	 examining	 the	 impact	 of	
economic	insecurity	on	the	Brexit	referendum	vote.	Drawing	on	research	that	has	examined	
the	 role	 of	 economic	 insecurity	 and	 labour	market	 institutions	 on	 far	 right	 party	 support	
(Halikiopoulou	 and	 Vlandas	 2016;	 Vlandas	 and	 Halikiopoulou	 2016),	 we	 explore	 the	
determinants	 of	 individual	 support	 for	 Brexit.	 Our	 focus	 is	 on	 several	 factors	 relating	 to	
economic	insecurity	that	have	all	received	significant	attention	in	broader	political	economy	
debates	 including	 income,	 occupation,	 unemployment,	 poverty	 and	 the	 level	 and	 type	 of	
education.	Our	analysis	pays	particular	attention	to	the	labour	market	position	of	individuals	
and	the	labour	market	risks	they	face	as	we	want	to	examine	whether-	and	if	so	how-	the	
risk	 of	 being	 unemployed,	 the	 risk	 of	 being	 in	 poverty	 and	 housing	 risk	 (whether	 or	 not	
individuals	 rent	 their	 accommodation)	 have	 influenced	 support	 for	 Brexit.	 We	 also	




Our	 findings	 overall	 support	 the	 economic	 insecurity	 thesis.	 Our	 results	 from	 a	 logistic	
regression	 analysis	 of	 the	 British	 Election	 Study	 suggest	 that	white	 respondents,	 those	 at	
higher	risk	of	poverty,	below	the	median	income,	with	no	formal	education	are	more	likely	
to	 vote	 for	 Brexit.	 Surprisingly,	 those	 that	 self-identify	 as	 being	 at	 greater	 risk	 of	
unemployment	and	those	that	 rent	 their	accommodation	are	 less	 likely	 to	vote	 for	Brexit.	
Finally,	workers	in	routine	or	low	skill	occupations,	which	we	show	have	been	more	exposed	
to	 immigration,	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 vote	 for	 Brexit,	 while	 respondents	 that	 have	 studied	
‘protected’	disciplines	such	as	law	and	medicine	are	less	likely	to	support	Brexit.	Gender	has	




Our	 findings	 are	 consistent	with	 the	 state	 of	 the	 art	 in	 the	 emerging	 literature	 on	Brexit.	
Most	existing	studies	have	emphasised	the	role	of	income,	employment,	age	and	education	
(e.g.	Becker	et	al	2016;	Goodwin	and	Heath	2016b).	These	studies	have	also	examined	the	





The	 chapter	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 We	 first	 provide	 a	 theoretical	 overview	 that	
contextualises	 party-based	 and	 public	 Euroscepticism.	 Here	 we	 juxtapose	 economic	 and	




economic	 insecurity	 and	 present	 our	 results.	We	 proceed	 by	 locating	 our	 findings	 in	 the	












and	 supports	 withdrawal.	 Soft	 Euroscepticism,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 is	 not	 a	 principled	




terms	 of	 positions	 on	 the	 left-right	 dimension	 (Hooghe	 et	 al	 2004;	 Van	 Elsas	 and	 Van	 de	
Brug,	2015).	Parties	oppose	Europe	on	both	strategic	and	 ideological	grounds.	 In	 terms	of	
strategy,	Euroscepticism	tends	to	be	associated	with	peripheral	parties	(Taggart	1998;	Sitter	
2001;	 Halikiopoulou	 et	 al	 2012;	 De	 Vries	 and	 Edwards	 2009)	 driven	 by	 protest	 and	
incentivised	 to	 oppose	 Europe	 as	 a	 means	 of	 differentiating	 themselves	 from	 their	
mainstream	competitors.	 Fringe	parties	of	 both	 the	 right	 and	 the	 left	 are	 therefore	more	
likely	 to	be	critical	of	 the	EU	than	 their	mainstream	rivals.	The	2014	European	Parliament	
election	 results	 confirm	 this	 to	 a	 great	 extent.	 The	 intensification	 of	 political	 integration	
within	the	context	of	the	EU	economic	and	migrant	crises	has	been	accompanied	by	the	rise	
of	far	right	and-	to	a	 lesser	extent-	 far	 left	Eurosceptic	parties	across	Europe	 including	the	
French	 Front	 National	 (FN),	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 Independence	 Party	 (UKIP),	 the	 Danish	
People’s	Party	(DF),	the	Greek	Golden	Dawn	(DN)	and	Coalition	of	the	Radical	Left	(SYRIZA).			
In	 terms	 of	 ideology,	 the	 EU	 project	 is	 underpinned	 by	 a	 rationale	 that	 is	 fundamentally	
opposed	 to	 the	 core	 principles	 of	 the	 far	 left:	 a	 European	 union	 that	 favours	 neoliberal	
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policies	 and	 the	 free	market	and	as	 such	 threatens	 radical	 left	 goals	 (Hooghe	et	 al.	 2004:	
128).	 Hence,	 opposition	 to	 the	 EU	 project	 originated	 mainly	 from	 far	 left	 parties,	 which	
opposed	free	market	economics.	Far	right	Euroscepticism	on	the	other	hand	is	underpinned	
by	nationalism:	a	 justification	of	opposition	 to	EU	 integration	on	 the	basis	of	 identity	and	
national	 sovereignty.	 Following	Maastricht	 and	 the	 intensification	 of	 political	 integration,	




two	 different	 phenomena:	 the	 former	 is	 associated	 with	 an	 opposition	 to	 neo-liberal	
economics	while	the	latter	is	seen	as	a	product	of	nationalism	(De	Vries	and	Edwards	2009).	
Other	work,	however,	has	shown	that	Eurosceptic	positions	may	be	understood	in	terms	of	
a	 cultural	 cleavage	 dimension.	 Halikiopoulou	 et	 al	 (2012),	 for	 example,	 have	 shown	 that	
both	 far	 left	 and	 far	 right	of	 Euroscepticism	are	associated	with	nationalism:	 the	 far	 right	
with	ethnic	and	cultural	nationalism	and	the	far	left	with	economic	and	civic	nationalism.		
If	 party	 based	 Euroscepticism	 is	 driven	 by	 strategic	 and	 ideological	 considerations,	 what	
drives	public	attitudes	towards	Euroscepticism?	Sørensen	(2008)	identifies	4	types	of	public	
EU	 opposition	 drivers:	 (1)	 economic,	 as	 money-based	 calculations	 are	 central	 to	 one’s	
evaluation	 of	 the	 EU;	 (2)	 sovereignty-based,	 as	 people	 tend	 to	 perceive	 increasing	 co-
operation	 as	 a	 challenge	 to	 national	 sovereignty;	 (3)	 democratic,	 as	 the	 intensification	 of	
political	 integration	 raises	questions	with	 regards	 to	 the	EU’s	 so-called	democratic	deficit;	




positions	 on	 left	 and	 right	 and/or	 economy	 and	 culture,	 and/or	 attitudes	 versus	 socio-
economic	 voter	 characteristics.	 Findings	 are	 often	 conflicting,	 varying	 across	 time	 and	
country.	Marks	(2004:	239)	has	referred	to	the	object	of	Euroscepticism	as	a	‘moving	target’:		
‘the	 relationship	 between	 left/right	 orientations	 and	 the	 degree	 of	 support	 for	 European	
integration	depends	on	when	one	 is	asking	 the	question’	 (2004:	239).	 Increasingly	 studies	
emphasise	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 socio-cultural	 dimension	 (Van	 der	 Brug	 and	 Van	 Spanje,	
2009;	Kriesi	 et	 al.,	 2008;	Van	Elsas	 and	Van	de	Brug,	 2015),	 linking	Euroscepticism	 less	 to	
left-right	 positions	 (Van	 der	 Eijk	 and	 Franklin,	 2004),	 and	 increasingly	 to	 public	 attitudes	







dimension	 of	 the	 Leave	 vote.	More	 specifically,	 it	 examines	 how	 and	 to	what	 extent	 this	
Eurosceptic	 vote	 may	 be	 interpreted	 in	 terms	 of	 economic	 insecurity.	 The	 connection	
between	economic	performance	and	Eurosceptic	attitudes-	mainly	seen	 in	terms	of	voting	






Economic	 insecurity	 and	 perceived	 economic	 risks	 have	 been	 shown	 to	mediate	 far	 right	
vote	 (Arzheimer	 2009;	 Halikiopoulou	 and	 Vlandas	 2016).	 We	 conceptualise	 economic	
insecurity	both	in	terms	of	unemployment	and	risk	of	unemployment,	as	well	as	the	risk	of	
being	 in	 poverty	 and	 the	 risk	 of	 uncertain	 housing	 conditions.	 A	 number	 of	 studies	 in	
political	economy	have	found	unemployment	to	impact	negatively	on	various	dimensions	of	
one’s	 welfare,	 such	 as	 well-being,	 life	 satisfaction,	 or	 other	 metrics	 (e.g.	 Jahoda	 1988;	
Gerlach	 and	 Stephan	1996).	 The	 risk	 of	 unemployment	 remains	 a	 source	of	 insecurity	 for	
those	who	return	to	work	after	a	period	of	unemployment	(Böckerman	2004).	This	in	turn	is	
expected	to	affect	political	preferences	and	is	thus	linked	to	voting	behaviour:	those	without	





see	 themselves	 as	 the	 ‘losers’	 of	 European	 integration-	 as	 well	 as	 modernization	 more	





because	 of	 protest	 and	 anti-systemic	 attitudes,	 and	 potential	 linkages	 made	 with	














In	 order	 to	 explore	 the	 determinants	 of	 the	 Brexit	 vote,	 we	 rely	 on	 the	 6th	 wave	 of	 the	
British	 Election	 Study1	 that	 asked	 respondents	 about	 their	 voting	 intentions	 for	 the	















the	 survey.	 To	measure	 the	 impact	 of	 age	 of	 the	 respondent,	we	 create	 two	 variables:	 a	
‘young’	dummy	variable	coded	1	if	respondent	is	under	25	and	0	otherwise;	and	an	‘elderly’	
dummy	 variable	 coded	 1	 if	 respondent	 is	 above	 65	 and	 0	 otherwise.	 As	 discussed	 in	 the	





point.	 In	most	political	economy	models,	 the	crucial	 factor	 is	 the	position	of	an	 individual	







no	 formal	 qualification.	 Among	 those	 that	 have	 undertaken	 higher	 education,	 the	 survey	
asks	 them	what	 subject	 they	 have	 studied.	 This	 provides	 an	 opportunity	 to	 test	whether	
respondents	that	have	studied	different	subjects	feel	differently	about	Brexit.	In	particular,	
we	hypothesise	 that	 respondents	 that	studied	medicine	or	 law	are	more	 likely	 to	want	 to	
remain	because	 these	 subject	areas	 lead	 to	 jobs	 that	may	be	more	 ‘closed	off’	 to	 foreign	
competition	than	jobs	building	on	education	in	the	humanities,	natural	and	social	sciences.	
	
Next,	 we	 want	 to	 test	 the	 effect	 of	 various	 risks	 on	 support	 for	 leaving.	 The	 first	 risk	 is	
whether	the	respondent	is	at	high	risk	of	poverty,	understood	as	being	“fairly	likely”	or	“very	
likely”	 (coded	 1,	 0	 otherwise)	 to	 have	 experienced	 times	when	 the	 respondent	 does	 not	







work	 in	 the	 next	 12	 months,	 and	 0	 otherwise.	 Again,	 one	 could	 expect	 that	 more	
economically	insecure	respondents	would	be	more	Eurosceptic	and	hence	be	more	likely	to	




The	 third	 risk	 concerns	 housing	 insecurity.	 We	 create	 a	 variable	 that	 is	 coded	 1	 if	







greater	 housing	 insecurity	 to	 be	 more	 supportive	 of	 Brexit	 both	 because	 they	 are	 more	





a	 variables	 that	 takes	 value	 1	 if	 the	 main	 income	 of	 the	 respondent	 comes	 from	




Finally,	we	 investigate	 the	 impact	of	different	 labour	market	occupations.	The	survey	asks	
respondents	whether	 they	are	 ‘employers	 in	 large	organisations	and	 in	higher	managerial	
positions’,	 ‘higher	 professional	 occupations’,	 ‘lower	 professional	 and	 managerial	
occupations	 and	 higher	 supervisory’,	 ‘employers	 in	 small	 organisations	 and	 own	 account	
workers’,	 ‘intermediate	occupations’,	 ‘lower	supervisory	and	technical	occupations’,	 ‘semi-
routine	occupations	or	 routine	occupations’.	 I	 create	 a	dummy	variable	 if	 the	 respondent	
chooses	one	of	 the	 last	 three	occupations	because	all	 three	are	 routine	and/or	 low	skills.	
Workers	with	 lower	and	more	routine	skills	are	more	 insecure	as	 they	can	be	more	easily	












The	 predicted	 probabilities	 for	 male	 and	 female	 respondents	 are	 very	 similar	 and	 not	
statistically	 different:	 men	 are	 therefore	 not	 more	 likely	 to	 support	 Brexit	 than	 women.	
White	respondents	have	a	40%	probability	of	preferring	to	leave	compared	to	31%	for	non-








of	 supporting	Brexit	 compared	 to	47%	 for	 those	below	median.	Having	a	 lower	 income	 is	






have	 studied	 law	and	medicine,	disciplines	 that	 lead	 to	 jobs	which	may	be	more	 shielded	
from	 immigration,	 have	 a	 29%	 predicted	 probability	 compared	 to	 40%	 for	 other	
respondents	of	supporting	Brexit.	Fourth,	individuals	in	low	or	routine	occupations	also	have	
much	higher	 predicted	probabilities	 (55%	 versus	 37%)	 to	 vote	 Leave.	 Being	 in	 a	 low-	 skill	
occupation	 is	 indeed	 associated	with	 greater	 support	 for	 Brexit.	 Finally,	 respondents	 that	
derive	 their	 main	 earnings	 from	 employment	 have	 lower	 predicted	 probabilities	 of	
supporting	 Brexit	 (35%	 versus	 41%).	While	 the	 risk	 of	 poverty	 does	 seem	 to	matter,	 the	
effect	 is	 small	 (39%	 versus	 42%).	 More	 surprisingly,	 a	 greater	 risk	 of	 unemployment	 is	
actually	 associated	 with	 a	 lower	 support	 for	 Brexit:	 respondents	 facing	 high	 risks	 of	
unemployment	 have	 a	 lower	 predicted	 probability	 (36%)	 of	 choosing	 Leave	 compared	 to	
other	 respondents	 (41%).	 This	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 notion	 that	 those	 facing	 high	
unemployment	risks	may	have	been	more	receptive	of	Remain	arguments	emphasising	the	
potential	adverse	impact	of	Brexit	on	the	economy.	Similarly,	renting	one’s	accommodation	
has	 the	 opposite	 effect	 to	 the	 one	 we	 would	 expect:	 respondents	 who	 rent	 their	
accommodation	have	 lower	predicted	probability	of	supporting	 leave	(35%	versus	41%).	 It	
may	 be	 that	 respondents	 who	 rent	 are	more	 concerned	 about	 the	 detrimental	 effect	 of	










Gender	 Male	 39.78%	 38.95%	 40.60%	
	
Female	 39.80%	 38.94%	 40.66%	
Ethnicity	 Non-white	 30.94%	 28.55%	 33.32%	
	
White	 40.32%	 39.70%	 40.93%	
Elderly	(65+)	 Not	elderly	 36.76%	 36.09%	 37.43%	
	
Elderly	 50.08%	 48.79%	 51.35%	
Young	(18-24)	 Not	young	 42.21%	 41.57%	 42.84%	
		 Young	 17.79%	 16.24%	 19.34%	
Income	 Not	above	median	 46.58%	 45.50%	 47.66%	
	
Above	median	 33.18%	 32.31%	 34.04%	
Risk	of	poverty	 Not	high	 38.93%	 38.24%	 39.61%	
	
High		 42.43%	 41.21%	 43.64%	
Risk	of	
unemployment	 Not	high	 40.51%	 39.86%	 41.16%	
		 High		 35.82%	 34.32%	 37.30%	
Education	 Formal	education	 37.93%	 37.32%	 38.55%	
	
No	formal	education	 64.75%	 62.54%	 66.97%	
Higher	education	
discipline	 Not	protected	 40.03%	 39.43%	 40.63%	
		 ‘Protected’	discipline	 28.72%	 24.96%	 32.48%	
Housing	 Not	rent	 40.86%	 40.19%	 41.52%	
	
Rent	 35.05%	 33.70%	 36.41%	
Earnings	from	
employment	 No	 40.55%	 39.91%	 41.18%	
	
Yes	 3.46%	 32.97%	 36.22%	
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Occupations	 Others	 37.49%	 36.86%	 38.13%	
		
Lower/routine	
occupations	 54.89%	 53.22%	 56.56%	
Note:	each	row	reports	 the	predicted	probability	of	a	dichotomous	variable	 for	 its	2	values	using	a	







deviation	 of	 the	 variable	 in	 the	 data.	 A	 positive	 coefficient	 suggests	 the	 factor	 under	
consideration	 increases	 the	 probability	 of	 the	 respondent	 supporting	 Brexit.	 For	 each	
variable,	 the	 figure	 also	 displays	 the	 95%	 confidence	 interval,	which	 is	 shown	by	 the	 line	










having	no	 formal	education,	and	being	 in	 low	or	 routine	occupations	also	have	very	 large	
significant	effects	on	voting	leave.	
	
These	 findings	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 fact	 that	 immigration	 from	 EU	 countries	 was	
particularly	 acute	 for	 certain	 occupations.	 Thus	 for	 instance,	 ONS	 data4	 suggest	 that	
between	 2010	 and	 2014,	 164,000	 immigrants	 with	 a	 professional	 or	 managerial	
occupational	 background	 immigrated	 to	 the	 UK	 from	 the	 EU,	 while	 169,000	 immigrated	
from	outside	 the	EU.	 In	other	words,	 these	occupations	are	under	 similar	 ‘pressure’	 from	
non-EU	and	EU	countries.	By	contrast,	a	much	larger	-	277,000	–	number	of	immigrants	with	
a	manual	and	clerical	occupational	background	came	from	EU,	whereas	only	64,000	came	
























Our	 findings	with	 regards	 to	economic	 insecurity	 are	 consistent	with	 the	 findings	of	most	
existing	studies	on	Brexit.	Focusing	on	the	socio-economic	characteristics	of	the	Brexit	vote,	
Becker	 et	 al	 (2016)	 emphasise	 the	 importance	 of	 variables	 “not	 malleable	 to	 political	
choices”,	 including	 education,	 industry	 structure	 and	 demography	 (2016:2).	 They	 further	
argue	that	“policy	choices	related	to	pressure	from	immigration,	fiscal	cuts	and	the	housing	
market	 are	 linked	 to	 a	 higher	 Vote	 Leave	 share	 especially	 when	 socio-economic	
fundamentals	are	‘weak’	(low	incomes,	high	unemployment),	and	when	the	local	population	
is	 less	able	to	adapt	to	adverse	shocks	(due	to	 low	qualifications	and	a	rising	age	profile)”	
(Becker	 et	 al	 2016:	 4).	 Goodwin	 and	 Heath	 (2016b)	 also	 focus	 on	 economic	 inequality,	
drawing	on	an	analysis	of	the	‘left	behind	thesis’.	Through	an	examination	of	both	individual	
and	 area-level	 data	 they	 find	 that	 “the	 poorest	 households,	 with	 incomes	 of	 less	 than	
£20,000	per	 year,	 as	well	 as	 the	 unemployed,	 low-skilled	 and	manual	workers,	 and	more	
broadly	 economically	 deprived	 groups	 vulnerable	 to	 poverty	were	more	 likely	 to	 support	
Brexit”	(Goodwin	and	Heath	2016c	online).	Studies	also	agree	that	education	was	a	strong	
predictor	(Goodwin	and	Heath	2016b;	Kaufmann	2016;	Becker	et	al	2016):	support	for	Brexit	
was	much	higher	 in	 areas	where	 large	numbers	 of	 people	do	not	 hold	 any	qualifications.	
Finally,	 another	 strong	 predictor	 was	 age,	 suggesting	 that-	 in	 line	 with	 the	 ‘left	 behind’	









partially	related	to	distributional	 issues’	 (Becker	et	al	2016:6)	and	that	there	 is	a	clear	 link	
between	Brexit	and	austerity:	‘just	a	slightly	less	harsh	regime	of	austerity	aimed	at	cutting	
benefits	 could	 have	 substantially	 reduced	 support	 for	 the	 Vote	 Leave	 campaign	 and	
overturned	the	result	of	the	EU	referendum’	(Becker	et	al	2016:	4).	This	is	also	in	line	with	
previous	work	that	examines	the	impact	of	economic	insecurity	on	far	right	party	support.	





of	unemployment	and	exacerbate	economic	 insecurity	 therefore	makes	 the	rise	of	 the	 far	
right	more	likely.		
	
In	 terms	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 immigration	 and	 the	 Brexit	 vote,	 findings	 are	more	
mixed.	 While	 Goodwin	 and	 Heath	 (2016c)	 did	 not	 find	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	
support	 for	 Brexit	 and	 immigration	 levels,	 they	 did	 find	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	
Brexit	 and	 change	 in	 immigration	 levels-	 in	 other	 words,	 in	 areas	 where	 the	 size	 of	 EU	
migrant	populations	increased	rapidly	were	more	likely	to	support	Brexit.	Areas,	therefore,	
“that	 had	 experienced	 a	 sudden	 influx	 of	 EU	migrants	 over	 the	 last	 10	 years	were	 often	
more	pro-leave”	(Goodwin	and	Heath	2016c).	This	coincides	somewhat	with	Becker	et	al’s	






referendum	 result,	 they	 argue	 instead,	 “was	 driven	 by	 long-standing	 fundamental	




the	economic	dimension.	The	more	 likely	Brexit	voters	are	the	 ‘left	behind’	 (Goodwin	and	
Heath	 2016)	 from	modernization	 and	 globalization,	 older,	 from	 poorer	 households,	 with	
lower	education	levels,	who	perceive	immigrants	as	a	threat	either	to	the	cultural	way	of	life	
or	their	economic	wellbeing	and	believe	they	are	competing	with	them	for	 jobs,	access	to	
social	 services	 and	more	 broadly	 the	 collective	 goods	 of	 the	 state.	 There	 is	 an	 additional	
dimension	to	this,	which	refers	to	attitudes	and	values.	The	key	to	this	is	sovereignty-based	
Euroscepticism,	 nationalism	 and	 conservative	 social	 values.	 There	 is	 a	 strong	 correlation	
between	voting	to	Leave	for	example	and	feeling	‘very	strongly’	English	(Goodwin	and	Heath	
2016c).	 Kaufmann	 (2016)	 also	 finds	 a	 correlation	 between	 Brexit	 support	 and	 socially	
conservative	 attitudes:	 those	 who	 support	 authoritarian	 positions	 such	 as	 harsh	 prison	
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link	between	 the	economy	and	Euroscepticism	 is	 often	 theorised	 in	 terms	of	 the	winners	
and	 losers	 of	 European	 integration.	 In	 other	 words,	 a	 vote	 against	 the	 EU	 is	 often	
understood	as	a	reaction	of	the	losers	of	integration.	We	theorise	this	in	terms	of	economic	
insecurity,	in	line	with	studies	that	have	attempted	to	test	the	effect	of	economic	insecurity	







gender	did	not	 play	 a	 role.	 This	 confirms	 the	hypothesis	 that	 economic	 insecurity	was	 an	
important	driver	of	Brexit	and	 is	 in	 line	with	studies	 that	 find	that	 there	 is	a	 link	between	
austerity	policies	and	Brexit	support.				
	




(2016)	 this	 is	 because	 long-term	 conditions	 exacerbate	 one’s	 socio-economic	 standing,	
preventing	 opportunities.	 Austerity	 in	 the	 UK	 exacerbated	 the	 effect	 of	 economic	
deprivation,	thus	increasing	the	likelihood	of	a	Brexit	vote.		
	
We	 know,	 therefore,	 that	 the	 typical	 Brexit	 voter	 was	 more	 likely	 to	 be-	 but	 wasn’t	
exclusively-	 older,	 low	 skilled,	 in	 manual	 employment	 and	 socially	 and	 economically	
marginalised.	This	voter	could	have	previously	been	a	UKIP	supporter,	and	also	was	more	
likely	 to	 oppose	 immigration,	 feel	 strongly	 about	 his/her	 English	 identity	 and	 adopt	
conservative	 –	 even	 authoritarian-	 values	 about	 social	 issues.	 The	 question,	 to	 a	 great	
extent,	is	how	to	interpret	this	data.	Studies	differ	in	terms	of	which	factors	they	place	their	
emphasis	 on,	 suggesting	 these	 characteristics	 were	 important	 either	 because	 of	 the	
economic	 insecurities	 that	 these	 voters	 were	 facing	 per	 se,	 or	 because	 of	 a	 breach	 of	 a	
broader	 values	 consensus	 at	 the	 helm	 of	 which	 lies	 identity.	 In	 this	 latter	 view,	 socio-
economic	factors	in	themselves	are	less	important	than	attitudinal	factors.	Future	research	
could	 focus	more	on	the	causal	 links	and	determine	why	and	how	the	economic,	cultural,	
sovereignty-based	determinants	of	Euroscepticism	affect	voting	behaviour.		
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